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Objective: Medical imaging acquired for clinical purposes can have several legitimate secondary 
uses in research projects and teaching libraries. No commonly accepted solution for anonymising 
these images exists because the amount of personal data that should be preserved varies case by 
case. Our objective is to provide a flexible mechanism for anonymising DICOM data that meets 
the requirements for deployment in multicentre trials. 
Methods: We reviewed our current de-identification practices and defined the relevant use cases to 
extract the requirements for the de-identification process. We then used these requirements in the 
design and implementation of the toolkit. Finally, we tested the toolkit taking as a reference those 
requirements, including a multicentre deployment.  
Results:  The toolkit sucesfully anonymised DICOM data from various sources. Furthermore, it 
was shown that it could forward anonymous data to remote destinations, remove burned-in 
annotations, and add tracking information to the header. The toolkit also implements the DICOM 
standard confidentiality mechanism.  
Conclusion: A DICOM de-identification toolkit that facilitates the enforcement of privacy policies 
was developed. It is highly extensible and provides the necessary flexibility to account for 
different de-identification requirements, but at the same time, it has a low adoption barrier to new 
users.  
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Introduction 
Medical imaging acquired for clinical purposes not only constitutes a valuable resource for patient 
diagnosis, but is also of great value for secondary uses in research and education. These secondary 
uses must respect patient privacy and should abide by the corresponding legal framework, which, 
in the case of UK legislation, is principally1 the Data Protection Act (1998) [1].  
The Data Protection Act does not affect anonymous data, i.e. data where all personal identifiers 
have been permanently removed, but some personal data is usually required in the aforementioned 
secondary uses. 
                                                          
1 There are other pieces of legislation that apply, like the common law duty of confidentiality or 
the Human Rights Act. 
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Even when patients give informed consent to the processing of their personal data outside the 
clinical environment or the point of acquisition in the research environment, it is desirable and 
good practice that the data are rendered “anonymous” before transferring it. Nevertheless, in some 
cases, there is a legitimate need to keep some kind of link between the de-identified data and the 
personal information. Such a link can be either unidirectional, or bidirectional. Unidirectional links 
facilitate the addition of new pieces of information about the same subject using the same 
pseudonymous identification, but they do not allow recovering the personal data from the 
anonymous data. Whereas with a bidirectional link there is a coded identifier that links the 
anonymous data back to the personal data making it possible to identify the person if necessary 
(such as might be desirable in the case of an important incidental finding). 
To clarify what are and what are not anonymous data, we can refer to the definitions provided by 
the UK Medical Research Council (MRC) in their “Personal Information in Medical Research 
Guide” [2]: 
• “Coded information contains information which could readily identify people, but 
their identity is concealed by coding, the key to which is held by members of the 
research team …” Coded information is not anonymous. 
• Anonymised data where personal information is concealed in such a way that the 
researchers receiving it cannot identify the person. The MRC further distinguishes: 
o “Linked anonymised data are anonymous to the research team that holds it, 
but contains coded information which could be used to identify people”.  
o “Unlinked anonymous data contain nothing that has reasonable potential to 
be used by anyone to identify individuals: the link to individuals has been 
irreversibly broken”.  
Nevertheless, even with unlinked anonymous data there is still a potential risk of subject 
identification through combinations of data held by the research team or other people with access 
to the information. 
Another difficulty is that it is not possible to build general rules that will suit all cases. For 
instance, in the case of rare diseases, the condition itself is a factor that increases the potential for 
identification and greater precautions have to be taken, while using the same criteria in other cases 
can lead to unnecessary destruction of useful information. In the case of imaging data there is the 
additional risk of identification from the pixel information, for instance a 3D reconstruction of the 
head can produce a potentially recognisable face [3].  
DICOM Standard and Data De-Identification 
Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM) [4], the standard for medical imaging 
communications and storage, defines an attribute level confidentiality mechanism. In part 3 (PS 
3.3-2008), a procedure is defined to encrypt attributes and store them in the DICOM header (in the 
“Encrypted Attributes Sequence”); while part 15 (PS 3.15-2008) Annex E defines the “Basic 
Application Level Confidentiality Profile” (the Basic Profile in the following), which lists the 
attributes that must be protected to provide a minimal level of confidentiality. Nevertheless, it 
seems that this mechanism has not been widely adopted yet. 
The de-identification process of the DICOM header must be adapted to the specific legal 
framework of each country and to the particular circumstances of the use case. For example, 
depending upon the specific use case data like patient weight or sex may or may not be relevant.  
Furthermore, there is no consensus on several points, for instance, whether DICOM Unique 
Identifiers (UIDs) should be changed or not. Another contentious point is the level of ambiguity 
necessary for anonymising some data, such as dates or postal codes, since even with relatively 
small amounts of personal information it might be possible to identify an individual, especially in 
the case of rare conditions. 
Multicentre Clinical Research Projects 
Imaging studies conducted in a single centre are typically small, so they can lack power and 
generality. That is the reason why multicentre clinical imaging research projects are becoming 
increasingly important; they provide larger cohorts of subjects with greater clinical relevance, 
more robust research results, generality and statistical power. They also encourage communication 
and interchange of ideas between researchers and avoid duplication of efforts.  
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In terms of privacy protection, in multicentre studies it is desirable that uniform anonymisation 
policies are adopted by the collaboration including a common data de-identification framework. At 
the same time, it is advisable to de-identify data near the point of acquisition before transfer for 
centralised analysis and storage.  
Existing Tools 
There are now a considerable number of tools (both commercial and open source) for de-
identifying DICOM data. Such tools employ various de-identification strategies with approaches 
that range from removing all patient related information in an automated way, which often renders 
the data useless, to manual editing with absolute freedom, which is impractical and error prone. 
Some software fails to provide comprehensive policies, e.g., removing the attribute “Patient 
Name” (0010,0010) and not the attribute “Other Patient Names” (0010,1001) thereby effectively 
disclosing the patient’s identity. 
We examined some quite diverse tools as examples and we will present them in the rest of the 
section; Table 1 summarises their main features. 
Table 1 Features comparison of several DICOM anonymisation tools. 
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Sante DICOM Editor is a commercial (Windows only) application that provides an anonymiser 
[5]. This anonymiser can process a single file, a study or all the files contained under a folder 
recursively. It also provides a mechanism to remove burned-in annotations by defining up to four 
rectangles that can be set to the background colour. Overall, this tool, clearly designed for desktop 
usage, is not adequate for batch processing in a production deployment for a clinical trial or 
similar.  
The RSNA (Radiological Society of North America) Clinical Trial Processor (CTP) [6] is a stand-
alone application that provides a customisable workflow and some extension possibilities. The 
                                                          
2 Attribute Level Confidentiality 
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anonymisation service is configurable via a script language, but this limits the possibilities for new 
anonymisation methods. CTP does not support the DICOM standard anonymisation mechanism, 
and does not provide a solution for dealing with burned-in annotations. This package is designed 
for clinical trials and incorporates a DICOM receiver, but it cannot be installed as a Windows 
service, so it has to be manually restarted every time the computer is rebooted. 
The Universal De-identification Platform3 (UDiP) [7], developed by IBM Haifa Labs, aims to 
provide a comprehensive solution to data de-identification of different data formats (including 
DICOM). It is available both as a Java library, and as a ready to use application. However, this 
commercial solution might be expensive and needs to be adapted to the local legislation.  
Recently (April 2009) the open source C++ Grassroots DICOM library (GDCM) [8] has 
introduced a command line tool for anonymisation implementing the Basic Profile and the 
DICOM standard encryption based mechanism. This simple command line tool provides few 
features, so it is not suitable to be used “out of the box” for a clinical trial or a teaching library. 
Materials and Methods 
This work has been developed in the framework of SINAPSE (Scottish Imaging Network: A 
Platform for Scientific Excellence) [9], a collaboration that seeks to enable multicentre clinical 
studies in brain imaging. To identify the requirements for DICOM de-identification in SINAPSE, 
we first reviewed the de-identification practices in the participating centres, and defined use cases 
to extract relevant information. We reviewed several existing tools and found that none was 
adequate for our purposes. Therefore, we took those requirements, used them to design a DICOM 
de-identification tool and implemented it. We then compared the result with those of existing 
tools. Finally, the requirements were updated using the feedback received from users during the 
development of PrivacyGuard, and were then incorporated into the next development cycle. 
De-Identification practices and requirements 
Although regulations on de-identification exist, it seems that there is no common well-established 
procedure to implement them. Instead, a multitude of different tools are in use, each with its own 
interfaces and features. In the UK, the CHERRI (Common Healthcare Educational Recordings 
Reusability Infrastructure - Practice, Interoperability and Ethics) project [10] has carried out 
surveys that “revealed that most practitioners were aware of relevant legislation and national 
guidance relating to patient consent and confidentiality but did not know how to translate these 
into processes in the local context”.  
Software currently in use does not provide a satisfactory default de-identification of DICOM data. 
This is dangerous because some users might not be aware of the necessary steps to obtain an 
acceptable anonymous dataset with such software and unintended personal data disclosures can 
happen as a consequence. Other software will remove (by default) too much data rendering it 
useless for the intended purpose. Some anonymisation applications just hide personal information 
in private attributes (mentioned in chapter 11 “DICOM Security” in [11]). In some other cases, 
personal information is disclosed in file or folder names and de-identification tools commonly 
overlook this. 
Depending on the use case, further measures might be needed, for instance, to avoid the risk of 
face recognition in a 3D reconstruction, but this is outside the scope of this work.  
Use Cases 
Another, important aspect is the various intended uses of data. We have considered the following 
three scenarios in the context of brain imaging: 
1. Sharing data in a multicentre trial: the amount of personal data to be kept depends heavily on 
the type of study. In long-term studies (e.g. on ageing), it is fundamental to keep the data for many 
years and to preserve the possibility of linking the data back to the individual for follow-up 
studies.  
                                                          
3Also known as IBM De-identification Framework for Compliance to Privacy Laws. 
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2. End of project data publication. Data must be fully anonymous, but secondary analysis might 
require the subsequent linking of new data, and in such cases the use of an irreversibly encrypted 
identifier would be useful. 
3. Education. This is again a case for unlinked pseudonymisation. Some personal data, such as age, 
should be retained, as they are useful for the purposes of education. 
Requirements 
The following essential requirements for data de-identification were identified in the review of the 
use cases described above: 
1. The data acquired in a clinical environment must be anonymous before leaving that 
environment.  
2. The tool must function on any modern computer platform; it should not depend on the 
operating system used.  
3. The tool must have either no or at least a very low adoption threshold. Ideally, it should 
not interfere with daily departmental operations and workflows. 
4. The creation and management of privacy policies must be relatively quick and 
straightforward for policy administrators. 
5. The tool must be able to handle images with burned-in annotations.  
6. The tool must support the attribute-level confidentiality mechanism defined in the 
DICOM standard. 
7. The tool should allow implementing anonymisation with unidirectional and bidirectional 
links with the personal data. 
8. Traceability: it should be possible to keep a record of the software used in the de-
identification process for audit purposes.  
We also identified the following desirable features: 
1. Open source. Reduces costs and allows institutions to adapt the tool to their own needs. 
2. Limited software dependencies: the installation process must be straightforward.  
3. Sensible default options to help support inexperienced users. 
4. Flexibility: the privacy requirements for the different use cases can be quite diverse, so 
the tool should be easily configurable while providing enough options to handle most use 
cases. 
5. Extensibility: projects may have unforeseen requirements, so the tool should provide an 
easy extension mechanism. 
Data Sources 
We used DICOM data produced by CT and MRI scanners from several manufacturers (General 
Electric, Phillips and Siemens) that included secondary captures as well as data that had been 
processed using PACS workstations to produce multi-planar reconstructions and perfusion 
parametric maps (Siemens, Carestream and Merge). Two of the CT and one of the MRI scanners 
were contained in a clinical setting and so no direct network connection to the central repository 
could be obtained, data from these sources was anonymised on a workstation prior to being 
transferred to the central repository on physical media. To test the networking features we 
deployed our solution in two university departments, in Aberdeen and Edinburgh. These sites are 
interconnected by SuperJANET5 [12], the United Kingdom high-speed education and research 
network.  
For obvious reasons these data cannot be made public, so a test dataset (built with data obtained 
from the Biomedical Informatics Research Network (BIRN) Data Repository [13]) is available on 
PrivacyGuard’s project web site (http://forge.nesc.ac.uk/projects/privacyguard/) along with the 
corresponding outputs for different sample Privacy Policies.   
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PrivacyGuard development 
The programming language selected for the development was Java because of its multiplatform 
nature and the availability of several mature Open Source DICOM libraries. However, to avoid a 
strong coupling with any of them PrivacyGuard includes an adapter interface to access and 
manipulate the DICOM objects. So far, we have implemented this interface for two popular 
libraries: pixelmed [14] and dcm4che2 [15]. 
  One of the main design objectives was to make the toolkit flexible to enable the enforcement of 
different anonymisation strategies tailored to specific cases. To ensure that PrivacyGuard can be 
applied to many different situations the actual anonymisation procedure is specified in a Privacy 
Policy described in the next section. Using this mechanism it is possible to implement full 
anonymisation, linked and unlinked pseudonymisation as well as the DICOM standard 
anonymisation mechanism.  
Finally, to ensure PrivacyGuard can be deployed in a number of different scenarios it can read 
DICOM data from either a filesystem or a DICOM receiver and the anonymous output can be 
written into a directory structure or transferred to a remote computer using SFTP or a DICOM 
push. Fig. 1 depicts the different input and output channels available. 
Privacy Policies 
A Privacy Policy (for PrivacyGuard) is an XML (eXtensible Markup Language) document that 
defines de-identification rules. These rules are implemented by Java classes that, to ensure 
authenticity, must be distributed in signed jar files (libraries). Several sample policies are included 
in the toolkit including one implementing the Basic Profile. 
 
To avoid manual editing of the Privacy Policies, which is a tedious and error prone process, we 
developed a graphical application we called Policy Editor (Fig. 2 shows a screenshot). It also 
allows users to sign Privacy Policies using XML Signature [16], by doing this the policies 
recipients can verify the integrity of the policy contents. 
DICOM header de-identification classes 
In order to de-identify DICOM header attributes that contain personal information, they must be 
manipulated by either removing them if not required, emptying their content, substituting the 
information for dummy values or ambiguating their values. As part of the toolkit, we have 
implemented some sample de-identification classes for these operations. However, users can 
implement their own methods by providing classes that are loaded at run time.  PrivacyGuard also 
will by default remove all private tags in the DICOM header, although this can be configured. 
Burned-in annotations 
Personal information may exist in the pixel data contained in DICOM objects. PrivacyGuard 
default action is to skip objects with the “burned-in” flag or identified as secondary captures. 
Alternatively, it is possible to clean the pixels by executing a user-defined class. The toolkit 
includes sample classes that implement straightforward methods like blacking out predefined 
zones of the image or pixels with values about certain threshold. Again, users can implement their 
own methods providing the potential to use more sophisticated approaches, for instance the 
method presented in [17] for detecting the textual information present in the pixels using wavelets.  
Traceability 
As stated before the classes used for the anonymisation operations must be provided in signed jar 
files. This not only allows their authenticity to be checked, but also allows the user to keep track of 
the anonymisation operations. PrivacyGuard can store traceability information in two non-
exclusive ways: 
• Along with the data by adding the information to the DICOM header. When anonymising 
a DICOM object information about the anonymisation process is added to the De-
Identification Method (0012,0063) attribute.  
• Externally: currently PrivacyGuard supports the storage of this information in log files. 
Different levels of details can be selected. 
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Applications 
PrivacyGuard includes two applications: one for anonymising DICOM files contained in a folder, 
and a DICOM receiver-anonymiser (that can run as both a Windows service and a Linux daemon). 
Both are highly configurable and allow the execution of other operations in addition to the 
anonymisation such as archiving DICOM objects in the local file system or transporting them to 
remote computers using SFTP or a DICOM ‘push’. 
Multisite Deployment Support 
A simple way of using a common Privacy Policy between centres is to publish it on a web server 
and configure PrivacyGuard on all sites to read the Privacy Policy from that web server. 
Furthermore, PrivacyGuard can also use directly signed jar files deployed on a web server. This 
centralised deployment not only helps to maintain coherence, but also eases the update procedures 
for policies and software. Fig. 3 shows a sketch of the lifecycle of a Privacy Policy from its 
creation using Policy Editor to its use by PrivacyGuard. 
Results 
Features Tests 
PrivacyGuard has been able to anonymise DICOM objects produced by different manufacturers’ 
equipment successfully. It correctly de-identified DICOM data produced by General Electric, 
Phillips and Siemens CT and MRI scanners, as well as DICOM objects produced by post 
processing. The tests also included using the two DICOM libraries (pixelmed and dcm4che2) for 
which we have implemented our interface. Other features tested included: 
1. Testing of PrivacyGuard in Windows XP and several Linux distributions (RedHat, 
Scientific Linux and Ubuntu). 
2. Testing the ability to detect secondary captures and black out the predefined zones of the 
images. 
3. Finding and anonymising DICOM files contained under a given folder. 
4. Receiving and anonymising DICOM objects sent using DICOM ‘push’ by dcm4che2 
dcmsnd utility. 
5. Transferring anonymised data using SFTP and DICOM to a remote computer.  
6. Testing of the DICOM encryption mechanism. It was possible to anonymise the personal 
data attributes and store them encrypted inside the DICOM object, and recover later the 
information. A dataset from Grassroots DICOM library was used for this test.  
7. We checked the correct inclusion of tracking information in the DICOM header and the 
generation of audit logs. 
All these tests were successful, and we checked that the deployment of PrivacyGuard provides a 




PrivacyGuard has been successfully deployed in a distributed environment: data were collected at 
Aberdeen and Edinburgh and stored locally. Then using PrivacyGuard the data were anonymised 
and transferred (using SFTP) to the processing site located in Edinburgh. Fig. 4 shows the data 
flow in the multicentre test. The flexibility of PrivacyGuard allowed a different range of subject 
pseudo-identifiers for each of the sites so that the contributing centres could be easily identified.  
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Discussion 
We reviewed several existing DICOM de-identification tools and found out that none of them 
satisfied the criteria we had established. Only one of them, the otherwise very limited 
anonymisation utility of the Grassroot DICOM library, implements the DICOM standard attribute 
level confidentiality mechanism.  
PrivacyGuard is a DICOM de-identification toolkit that facilitates the enforcement of privacy 
policies with no restrictions on the model chosen. For instance, it supports the DICOM standard 
confidentiality mechanism, but it does not impose its usage. It can also deal with burned-in 
annotations and its extension mechanism allows users to adapt it to their needs easily without 
modifying the library. At the same time, it comes with classes that support the most common use 
cases; this provides a low adoption barrier to new users.  
 PrivacyGuard is implemented in Java so it can run on most modern platforms. It is available 
under an Open Source licence and can be downloaded from 
http://forge.nesc.ac.uk/projects/privacyguard/. One of the advantages of PrivacyGuard is the 
possibility of making decisions to change the de-identification strategy in the configuration and 
Privacy Policy files. In this way, changes in regulations and de-identification rules can be enforced 
without any need to change the code. This along with its ability to read Privacy Policies and jar 
files from a centralised site, eases the deployment of the solution in multicentre projects. 
Its flexibility along with the support for the encryption based DICOM anonymisation mechanism 
allows, for instance, to provide an alternative to the total removal of private attributes. These 
attributes can potentially contain personal data so they must not appear in the header. However, 
some manufacturers’ software makes use of them; to support that use case PrivacyGuard can 
encrypt their content into the Encrypted Attributes Sequence so they can be recovered when 
necessary.  
Finally, we have incorporated traceability features; in particular, PrivacyGuard can insert into the 
DICOM header information about the processing done and generates logs with information on the 
data processed and the policies used for that processing.  
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Fig. 1 High-level overview of the data flow, including different data input and output options 
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Fig. 2 Screenshot of the Policy Editor application 
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Fig. 3 Lifecycyle of a Privacy Policy: 1) creation using PolicyEditor, 2) upload to a Web Server 
for sharing, 3) PrivacyGuard reads the policy from the web server and 4) applies it to the DICOM 
data 
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Fig. 4 Data flow in the multicentre test 
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